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The author examines the relevance of several contempo-
rary movements in continental philosophy and social theory to
the field of legal studies. In particular, the author examines
phenomenology, structuralism, and hermeneutics-theories
that have received widespread academic attention-and sug-
gests some possible jurisprudential applications of each one.
These applications, the author indicates, can instill a new vi-
tality into American legal scholarship.
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Commentators have often criticized American legal scholar-
ship for its isolation from the insights and methods of other aca-
demic disciplines.' Recently, legal scholars have begun to derive
insights from work in other fields such as history,' economics,' an-
thropology,4 and psychiatry,S as well as from the analytical fields of
logic,6 statisticsJ and mathematical theory.8 Although there has
been some work drawing on Marxist9 and psychoanalytical per-
spectives,10 American legal study has remained geographically pro-
vincial, limiting itself to the consideration of those scholars work-
ing within the Anglo-American intellectual tradition. In the area of
theory and criticism, there has been some treatment of contem-
porary continental work. Nonetheless, American legal scholars
have largely ignored the dynamic and rich reservoir of philosophi-
cal and social theory of contemporary Europe. The failure to elicit
more from contemporary continental theory seems particularly un-
fortunate in view of its apparent and suggested legal applications.
Indeed, some of the most insightful and dynamic work in philoso-
phy and social theory was accomplished in Europe during the last
twenty-five years."' This includes work in the continental theories
of phenomenology,I structuralism,1 4 and hermeneutics."S
1. See H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 61 (1972). The
authors conclude: "[T]here is a need for the study of law which is not rigidly linked to
professional study and which works closely with other academic disciplines."
2. See generally LAW IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTION IN THE LAW
(H. Hartog ed. 1981) (collection of papers exploring the application of contemporary histori-
ography to legal subject matter).
3. See, e.g., THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS (H. Manne ed. 1975) (collection of
articles applying microeconomic theory to a broad range of legal subjects).
4. See, e.g., LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY (L. Nader ed. 1969) (case studies and com-
parative anthropological materials involving Western and other societies).
5. See, e.g., READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY (R. Allen, E. Ferster & J. Rubin rev. ed.
1975). This book provides an extensive collection of theoretical and applied materials on law
and psychiatry.
6. See, e.g., I. TAMMELO, MODERN LOGIC IN THE SERVICE OF LAW (1978).
7. See, e.g., Zimring, Games with Guns and Statistics, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1113.
8. See, e.g., Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARv. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
9. See, e.g., B. EDELMAN, OWNERSHIP OF THE IMAGE: ELEMENTS FOR A MARXIST THEORY
OF LAW (1979).
10. See, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1979).
11. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCI-
ETY (1976).
12. See generally P. RiCOEUR, MAIN TRENDS IN PHILOSOPHY (1979) (setting out those
fields of philosophy in which research, publication, and discussion are most active).
13. See generally H. SPIEGELBERG, THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1976)
(includes a brief critique of major figures of the movement and extensive bibliographical
material).
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Phenomenology,16 structuralism, 17 and hermeneutics" s are sig-
nificant for a number of reasons. Each approach has received wide-
spread attention in European academic circles.19 Each has strongly
influenced a significant number of Anglo-American philosophers,' 0
social theorists,21 literary critics,12 and social scientists.23 Continen-
tal theorists have explicitly considered "legal" issues and suggested
the jurisprudential implications of their analysis.'. Legal applica-
tions of these methodologies already have been presented in vari-
ous journals. 25 This article will briefly describe the methodologies
14. See generally STRUCTURALISM (D. Robey ed. 1973) (includes a series of papers that
explore structuralism in a number of areas of study). Major figures of the movement are
reviewed in E. KURZWEL., THE AGE OF STRUCTURALISM (1980).
15. See generally J. BLEICHER, CoNTrM ORuv HaumEurlcs (1980) (examines the
major figures of the methodology of hermeneutics). A useful general introduction to the
hermeneutical methodology is R. PALMER, HEImENRlcs (1969).
16. One commentator defined phenomenology as "a philosophical movement whose pri-
mary objective is the direct investigation and description of phenomena as consciously ex-
perienced, without theories about their causal explanation and as free as possible from
unexamined preconceptions and presuppositions." H. SPIEGELERRG, DOING PHENOMENOLOGY
3 (1975).
17. Structuralism has been described as "a method whose primary intention is to per-
mit the investigator to go beyond a pure description of what he perceives or experiences, in
the direction of the quality of rationality which underlies the social phenomena with which
he is concerned." M. LANE, INTRODUCTION TO STRUCTURALISM 31 (1960).
18. "[Hjermeneutics is the concern with speech and writing, and hence with the meth-
odology of interpretation of texts." D. Hoy, THs CamcAL CIRCLE: LrTEAURE, HISTORY, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEuTics 1 (1978).
19. See, e.g., V. DEscomans, MODERN FRENCH PHILOSOPHY (1980).
20. See, e.g., N. CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MND (1968); D. IHDE, HEMENEUTIC PHENOM-
ENOLOGY (1971); PHENOMENOLOGY IN AMERICA (J. Edie ed. 1967).
21. See, e.g., F. DALLmAYR, BEYOND DOGMA Am DEsPAn TOWARD A CRITICAL PHENOME-
NOLOGY OF POLmCS (1981); M. GLUCKSMAN, STucru ns ANALYSIS IN CONTEMPORARY So-
CIAL THOUGHT (1974); C. SUMNER, READING IDEOLOGIES (1979).
22. See, e.g., P. DE MAN, ALLEGORIES OF READING (1979); G. STRICKLAND, STRUCTURAL-
ISM OR CRrTCISM (1981); D. WHITE, HImEGGER AND THE LANGUAGE OF PoErY (1978).
23. See, e.g., Z. BAUMAN, HERMENEUTnCs AND SOCIL, SCIENCE (1978); F. KATZ, STRUC-
TURALISM IN SOCIOLOGY (1976); PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (M. Natanson ed.
1973).
24. For example, Heidegger discussed responsibility, guilt, and punishment, and sug-
gested insights gained by using the methodology of existential phenomenology. M. HIDEG-
GE, BEING AND TIME 326-30 (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson trans. 1962). Piaget suggested
applying a structuralist analysis to the legal system in order to move beyond the identifica-
tion of logical form to the identification of a general structure of norms. J. PIAGET, MAIN
TRENDS IN INTER-DISCIPLINARY RESEARCH 31 (1973). Gadamer claimed that hermeneutics is
indispensable to jurists' comprehension of precedent, and he distinguished this process from
deciding a case by applying a rule or "filling a gap." H. GADAmER, TRUTH AND METHOD 290
(1975).
25. Three of these articles will be considered here: Morano, A Phenomenology of Negli-
gence, 5 J. BRIT. SOC'Y FOR PHENOMENOLOGY 135 (1974); Hermann, A Structuralist Ap-
proach to Legal Reasoning, 48 S. CAL. L. Rzv. 1131 (1974); Michaels, Against Formalism:
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of phenomenology, structuralism, and hermeneutics, identify the
theories' central elements, and present a legal application of each.
These applications will suggest their special contribution to par-
ticular fields of legal scholarship.
II. PHENOMENOLOGY
A. A Description of Phenomenology
Phenomenology was most fully developed by Edmund Hus-
serl.2 Husserl conceived of phenomenology as a type of descriptive
psychology,2 7 in contrast to an empirical psychology and its causal
mode of explanation. Phenomenology is an attempt to explain
the mind's representations of phenomena. Phenomenologists claim
that the "intentionality" of human consciousness colors these rep-
resentations.29 Intentionality is posited as an activity of human
consciousness through which objects derive meaning. This "activ-
ity" is instantaneous and nonreflective. In language, consciousness
determines the meaning of words;30 in perception, it determines
the patterns and meaning of what we see.31
One of the major functions of descriptive psychology is uncov-
ering and articulating the fundamental laws of the various modes
The Autonomous Text in Legal and Literary Interpretation, 1 POETICS TODAY 23 (1974).
26. The published work of Husserl is quite extensive. For a bibliography that includes a
listing of English translations, see D. STEWART & A. MICKUNAS, EXPLORING PHENOMENOLOGY
27-34 (1974). Husserl provided a basic introduction to his methodology in E. HussERL, CAR-
TESIAN MEDITATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY (D. Cairns trans. 1977) [herein-
after cited as E. HUSsERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS), and in E. HUSSERL, THE IDEA OF PHE-
NOMENOLOGY (S. Alston & G. Nakhnikian trans. 1973). Husserl's major works are E.
HUSSERL, IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE PHENOMENOLOGY (W. Gibson trans. 1931)
and E. HUSSERL, LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS (J. Findlay trans. 1970). Valuable commentaries
are M. NATHANSON, EDMUND HUSSEiL (1973); PHENOMENOLOGY (J. Kockelmans ed. 1967);
and J. KOCKELMANS, EDMUND HusszL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1978).
27. See, e.g., J. KOCKELMANS, supra note 26, at 87-97. Husserl did not seek "descrip-
tion" in the sense of representing static phenomena as a passive perceiver, but rather wished
to describe phenomena's content and variation in consciousness. See, e.g., E. HusS ERL, THE
IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 26, at 5.
28. The rejection of empirical psychology as a basis for knowledge is derived from a
judgment that the evidence of the world is subject to sensory error and illusion. Husserl
observed, "Not only can a particular experienced thing suffer devaluation as an illusion of
the senses; the whole unitarily surveyable nexus, experienced throughout a period of time,
can prove to be an illusion, a coherent dream." E. HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS, supra
note 26, at 17.
29. See E. HUSSERL, LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 337-432 (J. Findlay trans. 1970); see also
J. MOHANTY, THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY (1972).
30. See J. MOHANTY, EDMUND HuSSEEL's THEORY OF MEANING 54-76 (3d ed. 1976).
31. Id. at 24-53.
[Vol. 36:379
PHENOMENOLOGY AND LEGAL STUDY
of experience.2 These laws are called eidetic laws, and phenome-
nologists have attempted to provide an account of them in such
varied contexts as aesthetics, ethics, and logic.33 Eidetic laws are
not found in sensory perception; rather, they refer to the theoretic
intuition of the phenomenon's essence.3 '
The consideration of the phenomenon's essence followed from
Husserl's objective of establishing a rigorous basis for science. He
believed that science must have an absolutely firm starting point.3 5
The focus is not on concrete objects that are merely factual or
causal," but rather on the essence or eidos of things.3 7 The essence
is that attribute which makes an object distinct from all others.
Husserl distinguished empirical science from eidetic science."
Phenomenology is methodologically a science of essences, or an a
priori science. 3' These essences constitute the phenomena that
comprise the basis of phenomenology. The term "phenomenon" is
taken from a Greek term meaning "that which appears."4 The es-
32. See E. HUdSEL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS, supra note 26, at 69-75.
33. See, e.g., S. BACHELARD, A STUDY OF HuSSERL's FORMAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
(1968); E. KAELIN, ART AND EXISTENCE: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL AESTHETICS (1970); M.
SCHELER, FORMALISM IN ETHICS AND NON-FORMAL ETHICS OF VALUES (1973).
34. According to Husserl,
If we restrict ourselves to the pure phenomenology of cognition, then we will
be concerned with the essence of cognition as revealed in direct "seeing," i.e.,
with a demonstration of it which is carried out by way of "seeing" in the sphere
of phenomenological reduction and self-giveness, and with an analytical distinc-
tion between the various sorts of phenomena which are embraced by the very
broad term "cognition."
E. HUSSERL, THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 26, at 43 (emphasis in original).
35. See generally E. Hussm, THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL
PHENOMENOLOGY (1970).
36. "Natural being is a realm whose existential status [Seinageltung] is secondary; it
continually presupposes the realm of transcendental being." E. HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MDI-
TATIONS, supra note 26, at 21.
37. Husserl argues that behind the experience of natural phenomena lies an essence
that can be examined through the phenomenological method: "Thus, to each psychic lived
process there corresponds through the device of phenomenological reduction a pure phe-
nomena, which exhibits its intrinsic (imminent) essence (taken individually) as an absolute
datum." E. HussmL, THE IDEA OF PHENOMONOLOGY, supra note 26, at-35. Phenomenology's
purpose is clarifying experience by identifying the essence of phenomena of consciousness:
"If ... we ... confine ourselves purely to the task of clarifying the essence of cognition
and of being an object of cognition, then this . . . will be the first and principal part of
phenomenology as a whole." Id. at 18 (emphasis in original).
38. See E. HUSsEaL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS, supra note 26, at 11-14.
39. See E. HussERL, THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 26, at 46.
40. The Oxford English Dictionary traces the term "phenomenon" to the Greek "phai-
nomenon," meaning "to show, pass, to be seen, to appear," thus "appearing, apparent (to
the senses or mind), hence things that appear, appearances, phenomena." 2 THE OxIORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 77 (compact ed. 1971). Kant used the term to refer to the appearance
1982]
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sences of Husserl's descriptive psychology are ideal objects, inde-
pendent of accidental features of a particular consciousness. 41 The
word phenomena as used in phenomenology has a different mean-
ing than that adopted by empiricism.' 2 Similarly, its meaning is
contrary to the Greek meaning of the term since the meaning
adopted by the phenomenologists refers to that which does not ap-
pear to the passive attitude.'
The discovery of the a priori realm requires an appropriate
method; it demands that one turn to the objects themselves." Ob-
jects are not created by our thinking; they are given to us.' 5 Ac-
cording to this theory, we learn of things in an immediate and di-
rect way by neutral descriptions of their essences as they present
themselves to us. For Husserl, this involved the eidetic intuition,
which is an intellectual faculty of understanding." Because the
phenomena in consciousness are immediately given to us and are
of things, as distinguished from the "thing-in-itself," which, according to Kant, exists but is
not accessible to human cognition. One must therefore distinguish Husserl's use of the term
from Kant's meaning of particularized form. See I. KANT, CRITIQuE OF PURE REASON 256-71
(N. Smith trans. 1956).
41. Husserl states the meaning of the term "phenomena" for phenomenology in this
way:
The phenomenology of cognition is the science of cognitive phenomena in two
senses. On the one hand it has to do with cognitions as appearances, presenta-
tions, acts of consciousness in which this or that object is presented, is an object
of consciousness, passively or actively. On the other hand, the phenomenology of
cognition has to do with those objects as presenting themselves in this manner.
The word "phenomenon" is ambigious in virtue of the essential correlation be-
tween appearance and that which appears. FatvdlMeIov (phenomenon) in its
proper sense means that which appears, and yet it is by preference used for the
appearing itself, for the subjective phenomenon ....
E. HUSsERL, THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 26, at 11 (emphasis in original).
42. See E. HussERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS, supra note 26, at 17-18.
43. Id. at 46.
44. Husserl asserted: "[T]he idea of science and philosophy involves an order of cogni-
tion, proceeding from intrinsically earlier to intrinsically later cognitions; ultimately, then,
a beginning and a line of advance that are not to be chosen arbitrarily but have their basis
'in the nature of things themselves.'" Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
45. Husserl argued that "genuine science, must neither make or go on accepting any
judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence, from 'experiences' in which
the affairs and affair-complexes in question are present to me as 'they themselves.'" Id. at
13 (emphasis in original).
46. Husserl identified the intimate relation with the phenomenological method and the
faculty of eidetic intuition in this manner:
[I]f we think of a phenomenology developed as an intuitively apriori science
purely according to the eidetic method, all its eidetic researches are nothing else
but uncoverings of the all-embracing eidos, transcendental ego as such, which
comprises all pure possibility-variants of my de facto ego and this ego itself qua
possibility.
Id. at 71 (emphasis in original).
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then described, they can be spoken of with absolute certainty.4 7
The truths derived from the phenomenological method, then, are
self-evident and not subject to contradiction. Therefore, eidetic in-
tuition provides a firm starting point for inquiry.
An eidetic intuition requires a special method. One must
abandon the natural passive attitude to adopt an eidetic attitude.48
According to Husserl's methodology, this involves two steps: the
"eidetic reduction 4 9 and the "phenomenological reduction."50
First, one has to eliminate all existential judgments; one must
"bracket" the world and abstract from existence.1 Only the objects
of pure or transcendental consciousness remain after the world is
"bracketed. '52 These then are subject to scrutiny through an ex-
amination of the intentionality of pure consciousness in the "phe-
nomenological reduction."58
B. The Application of the Phenomenological Method to Legal
Phenomena
Wolfgang Friedman suggested 4 that a basic objective of the
legal phenomenologist is overcoming the Kantian antinomy be-
47. See id. at 16.
48. Husserl argues that establishing a firm grounding of knowledge requires not only
suspending acceptance of the method of the empirical sciences, but suspending belief in the
natural world itself:
[Djenying acceptance to all the sciences given us beforehand, treating them as,
for us, inadmissible prejudices, is not enough. Their universal basis, the exper-
ienced world, must also be deprived of its naive acceptance. The being of the
world, by reason of the evidence of natural experience, must no longer be for us
an obvious matter of fact; it too must be for us, henceforth, only an acceptance-
phenomenon.
Id. at 18.
49. See E. HUSSERL, IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE PHENOMENOLOGY 61-75 (W.
Gibson trans. 1931).
50. Id. at 27-32.
51. See E. HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS, supra note 26, at 26. This "bracketing" of
the question of the existence of the world is referred to as the phenomenological epoch and
involves setting aside the accidental or existential features of experienced phenomena. See
also E. HUSSERL, IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 49, at
27-32. See generally Schmitt, Husserl's Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction, 20
PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 238 (1959-1960).
52. See E. HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS, supra note 26, at 25-26.
53. Id. at 33-37. See generally Kockelmans, Intentional and Constitutive Analyses, in
PHENOMENOLOGY 137 (J. Kockelmans ed. 1967).
54. Friedman, Phenomenology and Legal Science, in 2 PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE SO-
CIAL SCIENCES 343 (M. Natanson ed. 1973). This collection includes two other important
papers on phenomenology: Amselek, The Phenomenological Description of Law, and Frank-
lin, The Mandarinism of Phenomenological Philosophy of Law.
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tween the individual and the world." For the legal scholar, the
phenomenological method means investigating particular legal
phenomena; distilling the general essences of legal doctrines, con-
cepts, and institutions and their relations; and interpreting the
meaning of legal phenomena themselves.56
Donald Morano provided an interesting and illustrative exam-
ple of the phenomenological method in an article examining liabil-
ity for negligence.' 7 Morano used the standard definition of negli-
gence: "culpable inadvertence."58 He began by identifying "three
salient and crucial dilemmas""' in determining liability for negli-
gent conduct: (1) If the negligent person's liability is founded
purely on inadvertence, then how can the content or nature of neg-
ligence be determined, since the negligent person was not aware of
the neglect; 0 (2) If liability ordinarily requires a culpable mental
state, how can a person be legally responsible without having
thought of the legally proscribed act; 1 and (3) Why should the
negligent party suffer moral condemnation if he lacks the requisite
culpability? According to Morano, the last two dilemmas are inter-
related. Even though a negligent person effects harm through inad-
55. Friedman, supra note 54, at 344.
56. Id.
57. Morano; supra note 25.
58. Id. at 136. The definition of negligence as "culpable inadvertence" is not an idiosyn-
cratic characterization. It reflects a mainstream understanding of the concept.
The fourth kind of culpability is negligence. It is distinguished from acting pur-
posely, knowingly or recklessly in that it does not involve a state of awareness. It
is the case where the actor creates inadvertently a risk of which he ought to be
aware, considering its nature and the purpose of his conduct and the care that
would be exercised by a reasonable person in his situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE 126 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
59. Morano, supra note 25, at 136.
60. Id. The significance of this dilemma is particularly acute for a phenomonologist,
who seeks to examine the content of conciousness. Similarly, Glanville Williams maintains,
"Although negligence has occasionally been treated as a form of mens rea, there seems to be
every argument against this view. (1) Negligence is not by definition a state of mind, except
in the negative feature of intention .... " G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW § 36, at 102-03 (2d
ed. 1961) (footnotes omitted).
61. Morano, supra note 25, at 136-38; see also J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMI-
NAL LAW 114 (2d ed. 1960). Hall argues that negligence lacks mens rea and voluntary caus-
ing of injury, which are prerequisites of criminal culpability:
[N]egligence implies inadvertence, i.e., that the defendant was completely una-
ware of the dangerousness of his behavior although actually it was unreasonably
increasing the risk of the occurrence of an injury .... If state of mind denotes
an active process, inadvertence is excluded .... Since conduct implies an end
that is sought or hazarded, it is evident that a homocide or a battery is not
voluntarily effected by negligent behavior.
[Vol. 36:379
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vertence, he is nevertheless regarded as responsible and remiss for
failing to take due care."2 An appraisal of a negligent person as
immoral, however, seems to fly in the face of the unambiguous
moral tradition of the West, which holds an individual guilty only
if he has acted intentionally or with a culpable mental state.
Ultimately, viewing negligence as inadvertence leads to a radi-
cal distinction between intentionally causing harm and causing
harm through an inadvertent disregarding of risk.63 This radical
break leads to an inherent contradiction in such terms as "willful"
and "wanton" negligence.6 " An understanding of negligence en-
riched by a phenomenological analysis permits one to avoid this
radical dichotomy and apparent contradiction.
To resolve the dilemmas posed by a consideration of negli-
gence as culpable inadvertence, Morano proposes a phenomenolog-
ical analysis of negligence. According to Morano, a phenomenology
of negligence would intuit the invariant structure of negligence;
that is, determine the meaning of negligence for consciousness6
e
Morano begins by noting that consciousness cannot focus on every-
thing at once and that every inclusion is, simultaneously, the ex-
clusion of all that is not included." This understanding of atten-
tion provides a negative definition of inattentiveness or
62. Morano, supra note 25, at 138; see also J. HALL, supra note 60. Hall maintains that
"[t]he relevant ethical principle expressed in terms of mens rea, that penal liability should
be limited to the voluntary (intentional or reckless) commission of harms forbidden by pe-
nal law, represents not only the perennial view of moral culpability, but the plain man's
morality." Id. at 133-34.
63. See G. WLLIAMS, supra note 60, at 103.
Mens rea is a general requirement for crime at common law; but negligence is
not usually sufficient. In other words, negligence is not the kind of mens rea that
characterizes the ordinary run of crimes. This is because the justification for
punishing thoughtlessness is not so strong as the justification for punishing
foresight.
Id.
64. See J. HALL, supra note 61, at 124 for one perspective on this supposed
contradiction:
The opinions run in terms of wanton and wilful negligence, gross negligence, and
more illuminating yet, that degree of negligence that is more than the negligence
required to impose tort liability. The apex of .this infelicity is wilful, wanton
negligence, which suggests a triple contradiction-negligence implying inadver-
tence; wilful, intention; and wanton, recklessness.
65. Morano, supra note 25, at 135. Morano is in fact applying the phenomenological
method as developed by Husserl. See E. HUSSERL, THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note
26, at 56, where Husserl explains that "the universal is constituted in the consciousness of
universability which is built up from perception and imagination.. The content of intuition,
in the sense of a particular essence, is constituted in either imagination or perception indif-
ferently, while abstracting from existential claims."
66. Morano, supra note 25, at 139.
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inadvertence. Inattention, then, is essentially an omission. But not
all inattentiveness is negligent. Although negligence is to be under-
stood as an omission, it also presupposes a duty of attentiveness.
Negligence, then, is either a failure to take due care in an activity
one is performing, or a failure to perform an activity that one has a
duty to perform."
From a phenomenological point of view, the definition of neg-
ligence as "culpable inadvertence" results from an overly narrow
view of human activity. The narrow view examines the inattentive-
ness of the agent to a danger at hand during an isolated moment,
in which his failure results in harm. In contrast, phenomenlogists
consider human action on an ongoing basis and in a broader time
perspective. 68 In a car accident in which a driver hits a pedestrian
in a crosswalk, the driver's inattention at the time of the collision
does not cause the accident; it is caused by the driver's preoccupa-
tion with other concerns. Understood in this context, the driver's
activity involves attention to "other" concerns and a consequent
increase in the risk of driving.
A second insight gained by a phenomenological consideration
of human consciousness is that perceptive attention is not an all-
or-nothing proposition.69 Attention is not simply a matter of either
having or not having a specific concern in one's consciousness.
Rather, active awareness simultaneously involves holding various
complexes or modalities. These include perception, concepts, mem-
ory, feelings, imagination, and anticipation. Complexes and modal-
ities appear in various gradations of sharpness and centrality for
an individual at any particular moment. Thus, one has only a mar-
ginal awareness of many of the objects that exist in one's con-
sciousness.70 Accordingly, it would be unusual to be totally oblivi-
ous to an object of concern for which one is being charged with
negligence. When this negligence continues over time, and a person
consistently fails to be attentive to this concern, one may say that
the individual is reckless, or perhaps even "willfully negligent," be-
cause the general disregard for the proper object of concern in-
volves a chosen orientation. Within this account, negligence and
recklessness exist on a continuum, rather than as separate catego-
ries. Moreover, the term "willful negligence" loses its apparent
contradictory quality.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 140.
69. Id. at 140-42.
70. Id. at 141.
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Morano's phenomenological analysis of negligence significantly
adds to one's understanding of the concept. It avoids the dilemmas
and contradictions posed by a traditional characterization of negli-
gence. Negligence is understood as culpable conduct because it
reveals a failure to sufficiently attend to important features of a
situation. It is seen as both related to, and distinguishable from,
fully intentional action: negligence involves a probability of ad-
verse consequences, rather than the substantial certainty that ac-
companies intentional action. Phenomenologically, negligence is a
culpable misdirection of inattention. It is viewed as an individual's
semiconscious choice to ignore certain due concerns.
This consideration of negligence indicates a principal objective
of the phenomenological approach to law: the clarification of legal
values and postulates, and identification of their ultimate philo-
sophical foundations. Phenomenology's approach identifies the es-
sence of legal principles and institutions in a way that is neither
positivistic nor based on natural law. It is not positivistic because
it does not confine the ordering and interpretation of a legal sys-
tem to matters posited by legal authority or empirical data."1 Simi-
larly, the phenomenological method avoids analysis rooted in a
natural law theory72 of an immutable order by examining the im-
manent properties of legal principles and precepts in consciousness
of the phenomena. By locating these phenomena in the human
consciousness, the phenomenological method seeks to clarify their
nature in consciousness to determine "their" essences. Such an ap-
proach seeks to eliminate the apparent contradictions in empirical
analyses of legal phenomena.
III. STRUCTURALISM
A. A Description of Structuralism
Traditional accounts of legal reasoning emphasize the evolu-
tionary and functional significance of individual judicial decisions.
This approach involves case-by-case doctrinal developments in
which solutions are found for new problems raised by litigants who
are attempting to limit or expand a particular line of decisions.
Judicial opinions are viewed as enunciating general principles;
later decisions reflect efforts to "fill the gaps" of a doctrinal rule
and to extend the rule to new areas. This method of legal analysis
71. See generally S. SHUMAN, LEGAL PosrMvIsM (1963).
72. See generally A. D'ENTPEVES, NATURAL LAW (2d ed. 1970).
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stems from a perception of judicial decision-making as an institu-
tional process for weighing and balancing the interests of litigants
and thereby providing a resolution of conflicting values or inter-
ests.7 1 Within this traditional view, legal opinions are representa-
tions of conscious and rational expressions and choices of legal
principle. Accordingly, they provide a conceptual framework for
resolving future conflicts.
Traditional accounts of legal reasoning fail to establish an un-
conscious foundation for the development and evolution of legal
doctrine. A structuralist approach addresses this failure by identi-
fying the underlying foundations in human consciousness for the
development and evolution of legal doctrine. Structuralism is a
systematic attempt to uncover deep universal mental structures as
they manifest themselves in social and cultural phenomena.74 The
nature of structure and the theory of innate cognitive structures
first found expression in the field of linguistics, and subsequently
in such diverse fields as psychology, anthropology, and literary
criticism. 75
To illustrate the nature of structuralist theory, this discussion
will concentrate on the work of Claude Levi-Strauss.7 6 Levi-Strauss
73. See G. GOTTLIEB, THE LOGIC OP CHOICE (1968):
Since World War II in particular, the [United States Supreme] Court has been
dominated by a philosophy of adjudication founded upon the weighing of com-
peting values. This philosophy contemplates the role of the Court in constitu-
tional issues as the exercise of the choice between competing claims and inter-
ests and this choice is deemed to rest upon the exercise of practical judgment
based upon the factual particularities of each case rather than upon the gui-
dance of rule or principle.
Id. at 133-35 (footnotes omitted).
74. See, e.g., Mepham, The Structuralist Sciences and Philosophy, in STRUCTURALISM:
AN INTRODUCTION 104 (D. Robey ed. 1973). The author describes the basic feature of Levi-
Strauss's structuralist methodology in the following terms: "The most general point he
makes is that the forms of social life consist of systems of behavior that represent the pro-
jection, on the level of conscious and socialized thought, of universal laws which regulate
unconscious activities of the mind." Id. at 107.
75. For a recent study in this area, see N. CHOMSKY, THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF LIN-
GUISTIC THEORY (1975). See also J. CULLER, STRUCTURALIST POETICS (1975); C. LEVI-STRAUSS,
STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1963); J. PIAGET, THE PRINCIPLES OF GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY
(W. Mays trans. 1972).
76. A more complete account of structuralist theory requires examination of the work
of Noam Chomsky and Jean Piaget. The principal works of Claude Levi-Strauss are: THE
ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP (1969); FROM HONEY TO ASHES (1973); MYTH AND
MEANING (1978); THE NAKED MAN (1981); THE ORIGIN OP TABLE MANNERS (1978); THE SAv-
AGE MIND (1966); THE SCOPE OF ANTHROPOLOGY (1977); 1 STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1963);
2 STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1976); TOTEMISM (1962); TRiSTES TRoPIQUES (1974). The fol-
lowing works are valuable commentaries: C. BADCOCK, LEVI-STRAUSS: STRUCTURALISM AND
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1975); A. JENKINS, THE SOCIAL THEORY OP CLAUDE LEvi-STRAUSS
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has made the search for the fundamental properties of human
thought the focus of his work." His basic objective is uncovering
the universal, basic structure of human thought 7 8 which is deep
below the surface but is manfested in myth, language, cooking, ta-
ble manners, and the general structures of social life. This basic
structure, which is termed "deep structure," will identify cross-cul-
tural similarities.79
The anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss grew out of the sup-
position that "the theories and methods of structural linguistics
are directly or indirectly applicable to the analysis of all aspects of
human culture, in so far as all of theAe, like language, may be inter-
preted as systems of signs."80 According to Levi-Strauss, all social
activities and expression are types of communication that are
structured by the unconscious mechanism of the mind, which oper-
ates according to laws corresponding to the grammar of a lan-
guage.81 Through consideration of linguistic analysis and a study of
(1979); E. LEACH, CLAUDE LEvi-STRAUss (rev. ed. 1974); 0. PAZ, CLAUDE LEvi-STRAUSs: AN
INTRODUCTION (1970); T. SHALVEY, CLAUDE LEvi-STRAusS: SOCIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THE
COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (1979).
77. See C. LEVI-STRAUSS, MYTH AND MEANING 16 (1978):
What I tried to show in Totemism and in The Savage Mind, for instance, is
that these people whom we usually consider as completely subservient to the
need of not starving, of continuing able just to subsist in very harsh material
conditions, are perfectly capable of disinterested thinking; that is, they are
moved by a need or desire to understand the world around them, its nature and
their society. On the other hand, to achieve that end, they proceed by intellec-
tual means, exactly as a philosopher, or even to some extent a scientist, can and
would do.
78. See C. LEvi-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (C. Jacobson & B. Schoepf trans.
1963). In this study Levi-Strauss described the process of identifying deep structures as one
involving a sophisticated analysis directed at the objective of breaking through surface ap-
pearances. To the extent that basic structural elements seem apparent, one must be aware
that these elements may mask more fundamental aspects of structure. Levi-Strauss ob-
served that "structural analysis is confronted with a strange paradox well known to the
linguist, that is: the more obvious structural organization is, the more difficult it becomes to
reach it because of the inaccurate conscious models lying across the path which leads to it."
Id. at 281.
79. See generally C. LEVI-STRAUSS, 1-4 INTRODUCTION TO A SCIENCE OF MYTHOLOGY (J. &
D. Weightman trans. 1969-1981).
80. Introduction to STRUCTURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION 2 (D. Robey ed. 1973).
81. See C. LEvi-STRAUSS, MYTH AND MEANING 19 (1978): "It is probably one of the
many conclusions of anthropological research that notwithstanding the cultural differences
between the several parts of mankind, the human mind is everywhere one and the same and
that it has the same capacities." See also R. DEGEORGE & F. DEGEORGE, THE STRUCTURAL
PROM MARX TO LEvi-STRAUSS (1972):
Structural linguistics provides the methodological model which Levi-Strauss has
adapted to his anthropological analysis. He treats cooking, music, art, modes of
dress, table manners, and other forms of social activity as if each were a ian-
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social structure, Levi-Strauss arrives at a general structural model.
A structure consists of a model that must conform to four ba-
sic requirements:
First, the structure exhibits the characteristics of a system.
It is made up of several elements, none of which can undergo a
change without effecting changes in all the other elements.
Second, for any given model there should be a possibility of
ordering a series of transformations resulting in a group of mod-
els of the same type.
Third, the above properties make it possible to predict how
the model will react if one or more of its elements are submitted
to certain modifications.
Finally, the model should be constituted so as to make im-
mediately intelligible all the observed facts. 2
The critical step in constructing a structuralist model is identifying
the deep structures or the elements that provide a basis for trans-
formation into the complex surface phenomena under considera-
tion. It is in the deep structures of the unconscious that one finds
the basic foundation of human thought: the process of categoriza-
tion and organization.
Levi-Strauss summarized this core aspect of the structuralist
method in the following manner:
If, as we believe to be the case, the unconscious activity of the
mind consists in imposing forms upon content, and if these
forms are fundamentally the same for all minds-ancient and
modern, primitive and civilized (as the study of the symbolic
function, expressed in language, so strikingly indicates)-it is
necessary and sufficient to grasp the unconscious structure un-
derlying each institution and each custom, in order to obtain a
principle of interpretation valid for other institutions and other
customs, provided of course that the analysis is carried far
enough.88
Levi-Strauss employed this structuralist method in ethnographic
and anthropological investigations.8" After examining the myths of
guage, since each is a model of social expression. Like language, each is a type of
communication, a form of expression, and a system of behavior which is struc-
tured by unconscious laws. The structure of each corresponds to the grammar of
language.
Id. at xxiv-xxv.
82. C. LEvi-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 78, at 279-80.
83. C. LEvI-STRAUSS, MYTH AND MEANING, supra note 81, at 21.
84. See C. LEvi-STRAUSS, THE ORIGIN oF TABLE MANNERS (1978); C. LEvi-STRAUSS, THE
NAKED MAN (1981).
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the tribal peoples of South America, Levi-Strauss concluded that
there was a logical similarity between the polarities of cooking,
sound, and human self-consciousness. 8 ' To understand the signifi-
cance of the transformation of raw food into cooked food, one must
understand this transformation as a manifestation of a deep struc-
ture of the relation between nature and culture. This relation of
raw/cooked is to fresh/putrid in the case of food as silence is to
noise and as the deep structure of culture is to nature.8 6 This deep
structure in the human mind operates on the objects and sensory
characteristics of surface phenomena such as food and sound, as
well as on the forms of social organization and comunication.
B. A Structuralist Analysis of the Development of Legal
Doctrine
A structuralist account of legal reasoning should manifest the
characteristics of the methods developed by Levi-Strauss. In place
of the evolutionary or developmental account of legal reasoning,
deep structures and rules of transformation would provide an or-
ganic account of the development of legal doctrine. Structural
analysis posits an unconscious but cognitive foundation which,
through transformational operations, provides the surface struc-
tures of legal phenomena.
To illustrate the structuralist methodology as applied to legal
theory, I will briefly report on an earlier work of mine that was
published under the title, A Structuralist Approach to Legal Rea-
soning.87 In this article, I examined the contrast between the tradi-
tional account of legal reasoning and a structuralist account by ref-
erence to the law of electronic surveillance, 88 monopolies, 89 and
products liability.'0 The present discussion will be limited to an
analysis of products liability. The power of the structuralist ap-
proach is revealed by the extent to which it can identify a basic
deep structure underlying apparently disparate areas of law.' 1 For
purposes of this discussion, however, it will suffice to report on one
substantive area of doctrinal development.
This discussion focuses on the application of traditional legal
85. C. LEvi-STRAUSS, THE RAW AND THE COOKED (J. & D. Weightman trans. 1969).
86. Id. at 1-2; see also Leach, Brain-Twister, N.Y. Rev. Books, Oct. 12, 1967, at 6, 8, 10.
87. 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1131 (1975).
88. Id. at 1161-68, 1185-87.
89. Id. at 1168-72, 1183-85.
90. Id. at 1172-79, 1182-83.
91. Id. at 1187-92.
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analysis to the theory of products liability developed by the New
York courts. Thomas v. Winchester," decided in 1852, was an
early departure from the common-law rule that usually denied re-
covery for personal injuries if there was no privity of contract be-
tween the purchaser and the manufacturer of a product. The case
involved the purchase by Thomas of a bottle of medication that
was mislabeled "extract of dandelion," a mild medicine; it was in
fact extract of belladonna, a vegetable poison. A small quantity of
the medicine was administered to Mrs. Thomas, producing very
alarming effects. The court acknowledged that in a normal con-
tract case, lack of privity would have prevented the injured wife
from recovering damages." The court, however, considered the na-
ture of the drug business and the character of the product being
produced, and created a special duty on the part of the manufac-
turer-seller to users of its product. The mislabeling of a poisonous
drug was held to naturally and almost inevitably result in serious
harm or death to the person who used it." The "inherently dan-
gerous" nature of the product established a new standard of
liability."
In Loop v. Litchfield,96 the New York Court of Appeals at-
tempted to clarify and restrict its earlier decision. In Loop, a de-
fectively manufactured flywheel was sold to a purchaser who was
informed of its defects. After five years of use, a neighbor took pos-
session of the wheel and was killed when it came apart. The court
distinguished Thomas v. Winchester and advanced a theory that
conditioned liability on the "imminently dangerous" nature of the
object in question. The court concluded that in the sale of a misla-
beled poison, "[t]he injury. . . was a natural result of the act," but
in the case of a defective flywheel, "[tihe bursting of the wheel and
the injury to human life was not the natural result or the expected
92. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
93. Id. at 407-08. The court noted: "If, in labeling a poisonous drug with the name of a
harmless medicine, for public market, no duty was violated by the defendant, excepting that
which he owed to [the retailer], his immediate vendee in virtue of his contract of sale, this
action cannot be maintained." The court cited Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), as authority for the bar to recovery on a contract by a plain-
tiff who lacked privity.
94. 6 N.Y. at 409.
95. Id. at 410. The court concluded, "The defendant's duty arose out of the nature of
his business and the danger to others incident to its mismanagement. Nothing but mischief
like that which actually happened could have been expected from sending the poison falsely
labeled into the market; and the defendant is justly responsible for the probable conse-
quence of the act."
96. 42 N.Y. 351 (1870).
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consequence of the manufacture and sale of the wheel."' 7
A major shift in the theory of manufacturer-seller's liability
for dangerous products occurred in Devlin v. Smith.'8 Smith, a de-
fendant, entered into a contract with Stevenson, his codefendant,
for the construction of a scaffold for the use of Smith's employee,
the plaintiff. Smith's employee was injured when the scaffold col-
lapsed; however, the court held that Smith was not liable under a
restricted rule of employer's liability. But as the party responsible
for the negligent construction of the scaffold, Stevenson was held
liable to the injured workman because he constructed a scaffold
that would be imminently dangerous to the user if negligently con-
structed. Thus, the common-law rule was extended to provide lia-
bility for the negligent manufacture of a product that becomes
dangerous because it was defectively produced. The court limited
liability with a narrow rule of foreseeability. Accordingly, liability
to third parties could arise if a defect rendered a product immi-
nently dangerous and serious personal injury was a natural and
probable consequence of its use."'
In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 00 the New York Court of
Appeals extended manufacturers' product liability to include all
injuries resulting from negligent manufacture. In MacPherson the
plaintiff sued for injuries sustained in an accident caused by a de-
97. Id. at 359-60. The court reasoned:
The appellants. . . seek to bring their case within [Thomas v. Winchester], by
asserting that the fly wheel in question was a dangerous instrument. Poison is a
dangerous subject. Gunpowder is the same. A torpedo is a dangerous instrument,
as is a spring gun, a loaded rifle or the like. These are instruments and articles in
their nature calculated to do injury to mankind, and generally intended to ac-
complish that purpose. They are essentially, and in their elements, instruments
of danger. Not so, however, an iron wheel, a few feet in diameter and a few
inches in thickness, although one part may be weaker than another.
Id. at 358-59.
98. 89 N.Y. 470 (1882).
99. Id. at 477. The court noted that ordinarily liability of a manufacturer for defects of
a product would be limited by privity. Here the court held, however, that the defendant was
liable. The court reasoned:
[Niotwithatanding this rule, liability to third parties has been held to exist when
the defect is such as to render the article in itself imminently dangerous, and
serious injury to any person using it is a natural and probable consequence of its
use. As where a dealer in drugs carelessly labeled a deadly poison as a harmless
medicine, it was held that he was liable not merely to the person to whom he
sold it, but to the person who ultimately used it, though it passed through many
hands. This liability was held to rest, not upon any contract or direct privity
between him and the party injured, but upon the duty which the law imposes on
every one to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to the lives of others.
Id.
100. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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fective wheel placed by the defendant-manufacturer on an automo-
bile that had been sold to, and then resold by, a retailer. One of
the Buick Motor Company's suppliers had actually manufactured
the wheel. Evidence showed that the defects in the wheel could
have been discovered by an inspection, which the manufacturer
had failed to make. In holding for the plaintiff, the court relied on
Thomas v. Winchester, which it read as providing a basis for liabil-
ity turning not on the inherent, natural dangerousness of the prod-
uct, but on the duty of a manufacturer to provide a safe product to
those foreseeably affected by the product. 10' The effect of Mac-
Pherson was to shift the anlaysis of product liability from an ex-
amination of the nature of the product to the duty of a manufac-
turer not to be negligent in a manner that might foreseeably injure
persons who can be expected to use, or be exposed to, the
product. 02
In a structural analysis of the development of legal doctrine,
one begins with the premise that the significance of each opinion
lies not in its surface formulations, but in the unconscious deep
structures guiding the decision. Hints of these deep structures can
be found both in the language of the decisions and in the terms in
which the doctrinal postulates are cast. The focus of a structural
analysis of legal doctrine is to discover and formulate the deep
structures and rules of transformation that operate in judicial deci-
sion-making. To illustrate a structuralist methodology, it will be
necessary to reexamine the doctrinal development of products lia-
101. Id. at 385, 111 N.E. at 1051. Judge Cardozo, writing for the majority, reformulated
Thomas v. Winchester.
The foundations of this branch of law, at least in this state, were laid in Thomas
v. Winchester. A poison was falsely labeled. The sale was made to a druggist,
who in turn sold to a customer. The customer recovered damages from the seller
who affixed the label. "The defendant's negligence," it was said, "put human life
in imminent danger." A poison falsely labeled is likely to injure anyone who gets
it. Because the danger is to be foreseen, there is a duty to avoid the injury.
Id.
102. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. The court stated its holding in terms of foreseeable
injury to persons foreseeably affected by the product:
We hold, then, that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester is not limited to
poisons, explosives, and things of like nature, to things which in their normal
operation are implements of destruction. If the nature of a thing is such that it
is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is
then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be ex-
pected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will
be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then,
irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty
to make it carefully.
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bility in the New York Court of Appeals.
In its original formulation, the doctrine of products liability
limited the manufacturer's liability to cases in which products were
inherently dangerous and negligence in their manufacture led to
injury.103 This formulation offers a surface structural opposition
between the person injured by use of a product and the imma-
nently dangerous product negligently manufactured. This surface
opposition can be viewed as a reflection of a deep fundamental op-
position which characterizes human existence: the dichotomy be-
tween self and environment.'
04
A variation of this conceptual opposition occurred when the
New York Court of Appeals, in Devlin v. Smith, 0 5 broadened its
rule of liability. The court began to focus on the danger to other
persons resulting from negligent manufacture, rather than the in-
herently dangerous nature of the product. This shift in focus re-
sulted in the mediation of the deep structural element of environ-
ment:106 the natural condition of the product has been transformed
by negligence into a dangerous, unnatural product. This variation
can be thought of as a second aspect of environment, the human-
created environment.
In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., the court abandoned its
inquiry into the nature of the product and created a duty on the
103. The opinion in Thomas v. Winchester explicitly refers to the "nature" of the prod-
uct and the "imminent danger" created by its negligent preparation. The court noted, "The
death or great bodily harm of some person was the natural and almost inevitable conse-
quence of the sale of belladonna by means of the false label." 6 N.Y. 397, 409 (1852). The
defendant's negligent false labeling "put human life in imminent danger." Id. at 410 (em-
phasis added).
104. This fundamental opposition of self and environment is central in psychoanalytic
theory. As one commentator noted: "[T]he infant's original interest in its environment is as
a possible source of gratification. The parts of the psyche which have to do with exploiting
the environment gradually develop into what we call the ego." C. BRENNER, AN ELEMENTARY
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYsIs 41 (1973). See generally M. MERI.Eu-PoNTY, The Child's Re-
lations with Others, in THE PRIMACY OF PERCEPTION 96-155 (J. Edie ed. 1964). Merleau-
Ponty has made much of the child's need to organize its experience by developing dichoto-
mies of self from world and self from others. The child's perception is said to involve a
"profound operation whereby the child organizes his experience of external events-an op-
eration which thus is properly neither logical nor a predicative activity." Id. at 98.
105. 89 N.Y. 470, 478 (1882); see supra text accompanying notes 98-99. The court sug-
gested that it was not the nature of the product but the nature of the defect that gave rise
to liability. The court observed: "Any defect or negligence in [the scaffold's] construction,
which should cause it to give way, would naturally result in these men being precipitated
from that great height." Id.
106. Environment gives rise to a mediate opposition of natural environment and unnat-
ural or fabricated environment, an opposition of organic and inorganic and ultimately an
opposition of natural and social environment.
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part of the manufacturer to avoid foreseeable harm resulting from
negligent manufacture.' The fundamental opposition of self and
environment, which includes the previously discussed second as-
pect, was further transformed into an opposition of individual
(foreseeable user of the product) and other (manufacturer whose
negligence resulted in foreseeable injuries). The opposition of natu-
ral environment and unnatural environment was transformed into
an opposition of material world of the manufacturer and social
world, which is characterized by the establishment of rights and
duties.
In these product liability cases, one observes a shift in major
doctrinal premises from a reliance on the nature of the product to
a consideration of the foreseeability of injury within a social con-
text. This reflects a transformation of the deep structural opposi-
tion of self and environment to a second deep structural opposition
of individual and others. This transformation is manifested in the
surface structure of the present doctrine of a duty of the manufac-
turer to any foreseeable person affected by the product for the
foreseeable consequences of the manufacturer's negligence.
The opening of legal discourse to a new methodology that
avoids the formalistic and idealistic aspects of traditional analysis
is perhaps the most important contribution that structuralism can
make to an enriched legal scholarship. This approach provides an
underlying explanation for the shifts in doctrinal analysis that is
rooted in the nature of human thought itself. The opening of legal
discourse to examination and criticism from an extrinsic point of
view will now be taken up by the discussion of a third area of con-
temporary continental thought: hermeneutics.
IV. HERMENEUTICS
A. A Description of Hermeneutics
A hermeneutical approach to the study of law focuses on the
language of law and the problem of meaning, rather than on the
107. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). The court explicitly rejected the argument
that liability turned on the nature of the product: "The defendant argues that things immi-
nently dangerous to life are poisons, explosives, deadly weapons-things whose normal func-
tion it is to injure or destroy. But whatever the rule in Thomas v. Winchester may once
have been it has no longer that restricted meaning." Id. at 387, 111 N.E. at 1052. In its
place, the court adopted a rule which turns on a duty of vigilance following from the fore-
seeability of injury resulting from the use of a defectively manufactured product. The court
stated: "In such circumstances, the presence of a known danger, attendant upon a known
use, makes vigilance a duty." Id. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053 (emphasis added).
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elucidation of concepts or ideas that have dominated American le-
gal philosophy.108 This focus emphasizes the constitutive nature of
language in judicial decision-making and statutory interpretation.
Its concern, therefore, is with the active, rather than passively de-
scriptive, function of language.10 9
The significance of a hermeneutical approach to the study of
law may be seen by comparing it with H.L.A. Hart's approach.110
Hart stated his position on legal language in the following terms:
If we are to communicate with each other at all, and if, as in the
most elementary form of law, we are to express our intentions
that a certain type of behavior be regulated by rules, then the
general words we use ... must have some standard instance in
which no doubts are felt about its application. There must be a
core of settled meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of
debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable
nor obviously ruled out.1
Hart's theory of language has far-ranging implications for legal de-
cision-making:
[I]nstead of saying that the recurrence of penumbral questions
shows us that legal rules are essentially incomplete ... we shall
say that the social policies which guide the judges' choice are in
a sense there for them to discover; the judges are only "drawing
108. See M. ABRAMS, A GLOSSARY OF LIrERARY TERMS (4th ed. 1981):
In the narrow sense, to interpret a work ... is to clarify the meaning of its
language by means of analysis, paraphrase, and commentary .... Since the
nineteenth century, however, "hermeneutics" has come to designate the general
theory of interpretation; that is, a formulation of the procedures and principles
involved in getting at the meaning of all written texts, including legal, exposi-
tory, and literary, as well as biblical texts.
Id. at 84 (emphasis added). For a relatively standard approach to contemporary jurispru-
dential interpretation, see Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv.
407 (1950).
109. See, e.g., M. SHAPIRO, LANGUAGE AND POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING: THE POLITICS OF
DIscuRSIvE PRACTICES 86-87 (1981):
[Tihe traditional distinction between normative and nonnormative (empirical)
discourse is based on unsupportable theories of meaning. Objectivist approaches
to normative discourse fall ... because of their exclusive focus on the referral
function of utterances and because of their oversimplified notion of what it
means for a term or expression to refer to something. As Wittgenstein and Aus-
tin, among others, have shown, the relationship between speech and phenome-
non is complex. The positions on normative discourse discussed thus far break
down because words-ethical terms and expressions among others-cannot be
understood outside of the rhetorical context in which they are used.
110. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV.
593 (1958).
111. Id. at 607.
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out" of the rule what, if it is properly understood, is "latent"
within it."'
Language, in Hart's view, communicates both an objective meaning
and an implicit meaning. Rules of law, which are necessarily ex-
pressed in terms of language, have implicit meaning that the judge
must draw out.
Hart's description of judicial activity depends upon a theory of
language in which there is some fixed meaning, with both central
and peripheral clarities. This meaning is independent of the con-
textual use of language and the use of concepts. The jurist need
only draw out that which is already given. To a large extent, this is
an idealistic position: The jurist's interpretation is a constitutive
reproduction of what is already given. Lon Fuller challenged this
view by questioning whether it was helpful to distinguish between
core and penumbral meanings of a word or concept."' Contempo-
rary hermeneutics goes further in its challenge; it questions the ex-
istence of any ultimately objective or discoverable meaning. 114 The
jurisprudential implications are great. According to this view, the
judge must act in -every case like a legislator, giving meaning to
language through the act of interpretation. The judge must act cre-
atively to transform the relationship between legal rule and legal
fact. Because there are no given principles of law to be found, it is
mere myth-making to posit that judges are only drawing out a rule
that is latent within the factual setting.
Hermeneutics, a term derived from the Greek, is defined as
"related to explaining," with "explaining" understood as clarifying
or rendering clear the unclear." 5 It is derived from the name of the
112. Id. at 612.
113. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 630, 647 (1958).
114. See, e.g., Derrida, Living On, in DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM 75 (1979). Derrida
suggests the impossibility of translation and proposes the alternative of providing a reading
of a text:
"[Iln other words" does not put the same thing into other words, does not clarify
an ambiguous expression, does not function like an "i.e." It amasses the powers
of indecision and adds to the foregoing utterance its capacity for skidding.
Under the pretext of commenting upon a terribly indeterminate, shifting state-
ment, a statement difficult to pin down [arrter], it gives a reading or version
that is all the less satisfactory, controllable, unequivocal, for being more "power-
ful" than what it comments upon or translates. The supposed "commentary" of
the "i.e." or "in other words" has furnished only a textual supplement that calls
in turn for an overdetermining "in other words," and so on and so forth.
Id. at 75; see also J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976).
115. See R. PALMER, HERMENEUTICS 13 (1969).
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ancient Greek god Hermes, who was the Olympians' messenger.11 6
Hermeneutics first arose in theology.11 7 The practice of Bibli-
cal exegesis generated questions about whether Scriptures were to
be taken literally or metaphorically; that is, whether they were
self-explanatory or required authoritative elucidation.1 In the
nineteenth century, German philosophers such as
Schleiermacher l ' and Dilthey120 placed hermeneutics in a wider
context when they attempted to develop systematic principles and
methods for understanding expression in general. The method's
range of application was further expanded in this century by exis-
tentialist philosophers such as Heidegger 21 and Gadamer.122 Im-
portant work on theories of interpretation has more recently been




117. See P. RIcOEUR, INTERPRETATION THEORY: DISCOURSE AND THE SURPLUS OF MEAN-
ING 22 (1976). Robert Culley presents a contemporary application of interpretative theory to
biblical texts. See R. CULLEY, STUDIES IN THE STRUCTURE OF HEBREw NARRATE (1976).
118. P. RiCOEUR, supra note 117 at 22.
119. See, e.g., F. SCHLEIERMACHER, HERMENEUTIK UND KRITIK (1838).
120. See, e.g., W. DILTHEY, MEANING IN HISTORY (H. Rickman ed. 1961). For critical
commentary, see H. HODGES, THE PHILOSOPHY OF WILHELM Dn.iTHY (1952); T. PLANTINGA,
HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING IN THE THOUGHT OF WILHELM DILTHEY (1980); H. RICKMAN,
WILHELM DILTHEY: PIONEER OF THE HUMAN STUDIES (1979).
121. See, e.g., M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson trans.
1962). For a collection of useful papers on Heidegger's approach to hermeneutics, see MAE-
TIN HEIDEGGER AND THE QUESTION OF LITERATURE: TOWARD A POSTMODERN LITERARY HERME-
NEUTICS (W. Spanos ed. 1979).
122. See, e.g., H. GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HEmMNEUTIcs (1976); H. GADAMER, TRUTH
AND METHOD (1975).
123. Paul Ricoeur began his interpretative activity in scriptural hermeneutics and ex-
tended his concern with symbolic systems of interest to social studies. See P. RiCOEUR, HER-
MENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1981); P. RICOEUR, HISTORY AND TRUTH (1965); P.
RICOEUR, INTERPRETATION THEORY (1976); P. RICORUR, THE CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS:
ESSAYS IN HERMENEUTICS (1974); see also C. REAGAN, STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL
RiCOEUR (1979).
124. Jacques Derrida, best known for his work on the critical activity of deconstruction,
focuses on the activities of speaking and reading. See J. DERIDA, DISSEMINATION (1981); J.
DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976); J. DERRIDA, POSITIONS (1981); J. DERRMA, SPEECH AND
PHENOMENA (1973); J. DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (1978).
125. Michel Foucault is now associated with the view that there are important social
and political dimensions implicit in the form of discourse. See M. FOUCAULT, POWER/
KNOWLEDGE (1980); M. FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCOURSE ON
LANGUAGE (1972); Foucault, The Order of Discourse, in UNTYING THE TExT 48 (R. Young ed.
1981).
126. Louis Althusser is perhaps best known for his development of an interpretive ap-
proach to the work of Karl Marx. He denied the alleged radical break in Marx's early and
later theoretical writings. See L. ALTHUSSER, FOR MARx (1969); L. ALTHUSSER, POLITICS AND
HISTORY: MONTESquiEu, ROUSSEAU, HEGEL AND MARX (1972); L. ALTnUSSER & E. BALmAR,
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Hermeneutics is primarily understood as the systematic and
methodological inteipretation of texts. 2 7 This methodology has
been extended to interpreting any form of communication, and ul-
timately, to elucidating the meaning of anything that is thought to
have meaning.128 Accordingly, this methodology is of use to philos-
ophers,'"9 literary critics,8 0 theologians, 1 and, of course, legal
scholars and jurists."
2
One assumption of modern hermeneutics is that a complete
interpretation of anything thought to have meaning is impossi-
ble." ' Every interpretation reflects a standpoint. The interpreter's
conclusions, therefore, depend on what he wishes to know; an in-
terpretation is a reflection of the questions that one asks.8 In
looking at any "given text," it is obvious that a psychiatrist, liter-
ary critic, and social historian would each look at and perceive its
different aspects. Nevertheless, it is also clear that each interpreter
must first arrive at some understanding of the words of the text
before he can develop his own interpretation. Such an understand-
ing is arrived at through the reader's tacit agreement with the ex-
RzADING CAPITAL (1970).
127. See, e.g., R. PALMER, HERMENEUTICS (1969). Palmer observed that some commen-
tators have maintained that "hermeneutics can and should serve as a foundational and pre-
liminary discipline for all literary interpretation." Id. at 4.
128. See, e.g., J. BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICs (1980). The author noted the
broader application of hermeneutical methodology: "Hermeneutics is consequently engaged
in two tasks: one, the ascertaining of the exact meaning-content of a word, sentence, text,
etc.; two, the discovery of the instructions contained in symbolic forms." Id. at 11.
129. See, e.g., H. GADAMER, DIALOGUE AND DLMLcTm: EIGHT HERMENEUTICAL STUDIES
ON PLATO (1980).
130. See, e.g., E. HIRSCH, VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION (1967).
131. See, e.g., R. POLZIN, BIBLICAL STRUCTURALISM: METHOD AND SUBECTnvTY IN THE
STUDY OF ANCIENT TEXTS (1977).
132. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980).
133. See P. JUHL, INTERPRETATION: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY CRITICISM
(1980).
134. See id. Juhl notes:
One might argue that what a literary work means depends on the reader's pur-
pose.. . This is not, of course, to say that any interpretation of a literary work
is correct provided only that it answers a reader's purpose or interest. A further
condition is that the interpretation is linguistically possible-that it does not
violate the relevant linguistic rules. Thus, on this view, to say that literary work
has meaning m is to say (a) that m is one of the readings in accord with the
relevant rules of the language (at the time the work was written) and (b) that m
answers the purpose or interest of a reader. It is obvious that, on this theory,
there will be a fairly large number of equally correct interpretations of any given
* . . work.
Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted).
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pression of the text. This explains interpretive diversity.
The subject of a hermeneutical investigation is a particular
text or expression. 85 Hermeneutics deals with single entities rather
than general classes, and with particular relationships rather than
laws. Its concern is with the place of parts within a whole or con-
stituents in a system, rather than with uniformities. 86 Those en-
gaged in contemporary hermeneutics are concerned with spoken
13 7
and written'38 expression. Their concern is with the acts of reading
and writing and of listening and speaking. " 9
Hermeneutics concentrates on a particularized understanding
of the object of its activity. At its most fundamental level, contem-
porary hermeneutics is committed to demonstrating the basic im-
portance of language, not as a single factor in the human world,
but as constitutive of human society and permeating all human
relationships.
The complexity of hermeneutic methodology reflects the vari-
ous levels of significance present in any given text." 0 On one level,
the words are related to each other and appear in a pattern. Here,
interpretation focuses on the mode of expression. Another level
presents the issue of reference; this requires one to determine the
relationship between the words and the image or concept (meant
to be) conveyed. This is the problem of the author's intent."" Of
course, what is conveyed may be the result of feigning or contri-
vance. One may use extrinsic material to help determine the au-
thor's intent; this means going beyond the text. The results of such
an exercise will always be tentative at best.
Contemporary hermeneutics is not satisfied with a surface in-
135. See R. PALMER, supra note 115, at 37. Palmer observed that:
Carrying the implications of this broader scope of hermeneutics (as systems of
interpretation both implicit and explicit) into a definition of hermeneutics ap-
plying to both the biblical and nonbiblical literature, the perimeter of nonbibli-
cal hermeneutics becomes so historically vast as to be unmanageable.... The
implicit interpretive system in every commentary on a text (legal, literary, reli-
gious) ... would have to be included.
Id.
136. See generally P. RIcoEuR, The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered
as a Text, in HERMENEuTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 197 (J. Thompson trans. 1981).
137. See generally J. DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA (1973).
138. See generally T. TODOROV, THE POETICS OF PROSE (1977); Ferguson, Reading
Heidegger: Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida, in MARIN HEMEGGER AND THE QUESTION OF
LITERATURE 253 (W. Spanos ed. 1979).
139. See, e.g., W. Isim, THE Implmn READER (1974); Grice, Utterer's Meaning, Sen-
tence-Meaning, and Word Meaning, 4 FOUND. LANGUAGE 225 (1968).
140. See T. ToDoROV, INTRODUCTION TO PosrIcs (1981).
141. See E. HIRscH, THE AIMS OF INTEPRETATION (1976).
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terpretation of a text-it seeks to reach a hidden or latent mean-
ing.' This is not simply a search for the author's intent, since the
author may be unaware of the full significance of his text. One be-
gins by looking at the given text, and then searches for the ex-
pressed and the unexpressed intentions. This is a search for the
tacit agreement between the reader and the text. One searches for
a message that may be variously described as enclosed in, under, or
behind the text.
The simple verbalization of the text merely presents a surface
meaning. The principal concern in a contemporary hermeneuti-
cal reading is finding a better way to express what the text says to
the reader."4 The author is viewed as a product of his text, not as
the text's producer." Moreover, each text is necessarily woven
into the framework of an already existing body of texts."14 One of
the primary results of creating a text is providing possibilities for
the production of new and different texts."7 Interpretation, there-
fore, is both creative and intertextual."5
142. See generally DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM (1979).
143. This suggests the untenability of the "plain meaning" rule, which is often invoked
as a standard form of legal interpretation. See Note, Plain Meanings and Core Meanings, in
W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS 1033 (1972). Todorov argues that
[a] reading is no more than a manifestation of the work. Yet the process of read-
ing is already not without consequences: two readings of a book are never identi-
cal. In reading, we trace a passive writing; we add and suppress, in the text, what
we want or do not want to find there; reading is no longer immanent, once there
is a reader.
ToDoRov, supra note 140, at 4.
144. See Miller, The Critic as Host, in DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM, supra note 114,
at 217. The author concludes that !'[t]he ultimate justification for this mode of criticism, as
of any conceivable mode, is that it works. It reveals hitherto unidentified meanings and
ways of having meaning. .. ." Id. at 252.
145. See Gibson, Authors, Speakers, Readers, and Mock Readers, in READER-RE-
SPONSE CsrrICISM 1 (J. Tompkins ed. 1980).
146. See G. HARTMAN, CRITICISM IN THE WDERNESS (1980). Hartman demonstrates the
necessary intertextuality of written and read text, and of the text with others: "The com-
mentator's discourse . . .cannot be neatly or methodically separated from that of the au-
thor: the relation is contaminated and chiastic; source text and secondary text, though sepa-
rable, enter into a mutually supportive, mutually dominating relation." Id. at 206.
147. See Mistacco, The Theory and Practice of Reading Nouveaux Romans: Robbe-
Grillet's Tropologie d'une cite fantome, in THE READER IN THE TEXT: ESSAYS ON AUDIENCE
AND INTERPRETATION 371 (S. Suleiman & I. Crosman ed. 1980). "The reader too is caught up
in this movement. Projected into a larger intertextual space, he is afforded the possibility of
yet other circuits and connections, a fact that broadens the principle of variable readings
built into the individual text." Id. at 384-85.
148. See Jauss, Literature and Hermeneutics, in WHAT IS CRITICISM? 134 (P. Hernadi
ed. 1981). Jauss observes:
Every reader is familiar with the experience in which the meaning of a poem
discloses itself only as he looks back upon it in the course of a rereading. It is
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B. A Hermeneutical Approach to the Study of Law
Only recently has the application of contemporary hermeneu-
tics to legal texts been undertaken. Walter Benn Michaels demon-
strated its potential in his essay attacking formalist accounts of
meaning in legal and literary interpretation.
14
9
Michaels demonstrated the contemporary hermeneutical
methodology by applying it to disputed legal and literary texts.150
He used Wordsworth's poem, A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal, to
illustrate the methodology's approach to literary texts.151 The text
of this short poem reads:
A slumber did my spirit seal;
I had no human fears:
She seemed a thing that could not feel
The touch of earthly years.
No motion has she now, no force;
She neither hears nor sees;
Rolled round in earth's diurnal course,
With rocks, and stones, and trees.55
The meaning of this poem has been the subject of much critical
debate. Michaels discussed the interpretations of two critics, Cle-
anth Brooks5 ' and F.W. Bateson.154 Brooks believes the poem con-
veys the poet's "agonized shock" at the death of Lucy, the sup-
posed subject of the poem and object of Wordsworth's affection,
and his horrified "sense of the girl's falling back into the clutter of
things . . . chained like a tree to one particular spot, or . . . com-
pletely inanimate like rocks and stones."" Bateson maintains that
the poem leads not to a statement of horror but to an expression of
"pantheistic magnificence" because Lucy "is actually more alive
now than she is dead. . . . [S]he is now a part of the life of Na-
then that the experience of the first reading becomes the horizon of the second:
what the reader took in the progressive horizon of aesthetic perception becomes
capable of being articulated in the retrospective horizon of the exegesis.
Id. at 139-40.
149. Michaels, Against Formalism: The Autonomous Text in Legal and Literary Inter-
pretation, 1 POETICS TODAY 23 (1979).
150. Id. at 23; cf. supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
151. Michaels, supra note 149, at 29.
152. W. WORDSWORTH, POETICAL WORKS 149 (T. Hutchinson ed. 1936).
153. See Brooks, Irony as a Principle of Structure, in LITERARY OPINION IN AMERICA
729 (M. Zabel ed. 1951).
154. See F. BATESON, ENGLISH POETRY 32-35, 77-91 (1950).
155. Brooks, supra note 153, at 729, 736.
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ture." 1" Michaels pointed out that these two critics agree that
Lucy is now one with the "rocks, and stones, and trees" but disa-
gree on what this signifies. 157 According to Michaels, the question
is, "What is a rock?" " This question can only be answered by
knowing whether Wordsworth was a pantheist. The text cannot
present the answer, because it allows both interpretations.
The historical evidence concerning Wordsworth's attitudes
might resolve this interpretive dispute. Michaels cited authority
for the proposition that Wordsworth regarded rocks not "as 'inert
objects' but as 'deeply alive, as part of the immortal life of na-
ture.' "I' This suggests that Bateson's reading is more correct than
Brook's, but this can only be a tentative conclusion. The text of
historical evidence is open to the same ambiguity as the written
text. Michaels indicated the inconclusiveness of extrinsic evidence
by hypothesizing a letter by Wordsworth in which he concludes
with the following postscript: "I have definitely become a panthe-
ist."160 Superficially, this would confirm Bateson's reading; one
might think that Brooks would have to "send [Bateson] a congrat-
ulatory telegram. ' ' ' As Michaels points out, however, "it requires
little more than glancing familiarity with the academic (or any
other) world to recognize the Utopian character of this scena-
rio. ' 1" There are no conclusive dispositions in a field where dis-
pute constitutes a livelihood. Some would argue that the postscript
was ironical. They might cite A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal as
extrinsic evidence supporting their view. " This sort of interpre-
tive dispute seems characteristic of the legal field as well.
Michaels illustrates the point with a discussion of the parol
evidence rule,1 " which is the accepted standard for (not) admitting
extrinsic evidence to "explain" disputed terms. The hermeneutical
implications are obvious. The rule allows extrinsic evidence "only"
when the contract terms are ambiguous. "Ambiguity," however, is
both functional and contextual. In other words, the issue of ambi-
156. F. BATE'ON, supra note 154, at 80-81.
157. Michaels, supra note 149, at 30.
158. Id.
159. Id. (quoting E. HIRSCH, VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 239-40 (1967)).




164. The Uniform Commercial Code's general statement of the rule is representative:
"Terms . .. set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their
agreement . . . may not be contradicted by [extrinsic] evidence .... " U.C.C. § 2-202
(1978).
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guity arises only in the context of disputed meanings. This is like-
wise the only possible setting in which the parol evidence rule may
come into play. The circularity is apparent.
Michaels demonstrated the point with an analysis of Judge
Friendly's opinion in Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Interna-
tional Sales Corp.65 The defendant, B.N.S. International, had
contracted to sell to the plaintiff, a Swiss company, 75,000 pounds
of "U.S. Fresh Frozen Chickens, Grade A." The defendant-seller
shipped older "stewing chickens" rather than the young "fryers"
and "roasters" that the buyer had anticipated. The plaintiff-buyer
contended that "chicken," in trade usage, meant a "broiler, a fryer
or a roaster." The defendant maintained that he was not aware of
such usage and called an expert witness who testified, "Chicken is
everything except a goose, a duck, and a turkey. Everything is a
chicken but then you have to say, you have to specify which cate-
gory you want or what you are talking about."'"
The issue presented in the case was, "What is chicken?'1
7
The court ruled that it was proper to admit extrinsic evidence to
aid in the interpretation of this term, because "the word 'chicken'
standing alone is ambiguous."'' 8 Michaels observed that the word
"chicken" is not in and of itself ambiguous: "'Chicken' is not, after
all, an example of lexical ambiguity; in fact, from the standpoint of
the dictionary, 'chicken' seems a more than usually precise
word."' 9 Michaels illustrated this point by contrasting the state-
ments "he spent the morning at the bank" with "he likes chick-
en.' 7 0 The first statement may mean that he was either where
money is handled or where a body of water is held back from land.
The second statement seems to be less ambiguous-it "clearly" ex-
presses its subject's dietary preference.
Michaels argued that Friendly's belief in the term's ambiguity
resulted from the extrinsic evidence of conflicting meanings rather
than from the word itself.'7 ' The interpretative difficulty results
165. 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
166. Id. at 119.
167. Id. at 117.
168. Id. at 118.
169. Michaels, supra note 149, at 26.
170. Id.
171. Id. Judge Friendly's conclusion may be the same. In Frigaliment he ultimately
held that the buyer had failed to show that its intepretation was more reasonable. Trade
usage indicated that the term was quite vague. See supra text accompanying note 166.
Friendly later had second thoughts about imposing a trade usage on the claimant in such a
case. See Dadourian Export Corp. v. United States, 291 F.2d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 1961)
(Friendly, J., dissenting). In his dissent Judge Friendly indicated that Frigaliment would
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from the dispute rather than from any ambiguity inherent in the
term. This led Michaels to conclude that "the word 'chicken,'
standing alone, in itself, is neither ambiguous nor vague (nor clear
nor precise) and the contract isn't either.
'172
Thus, we may conclude that neither a text nor a word can
have an objective meaning, independent of its context and pur-
pose. The problem with the disputed contract term is its context.
This problem cannot be resolved by identifying words that are less
vague or ambiguous, because there are none. Michaels maintained
that the process of adjudication does not depend on words that
have a plain meaning.173 Meaning depends upon "undisputed con-
texts," that is, the meaning of a disputed term depends upon iden-
tifying agreement in one piece of language which can compel agree-
ment on the meaning of another.174 In Michaels's words, "No text
by itself can enforce such an agreement, because a 'text by itself' is
no text at all. '1 75 While it is true that "chicken" has a plain mean-
ing, "plain meanings are functions not of texts but of the situations
in which we read them. ' 176 This line of reasoning demonstrates the
hopeless circularity of the parol evidence rule. The rule disallows
extrinsic evidence that will "contradict" the terms of a contract,
1 77
but does not. establish guidelines that aid in determining the ad-
missibility of evidence. The litigants disagree on the terms of the
contract-it is the crux of their dispute. The judge necessarily de-
cides which evidence is at odds with the terms of the contract ac-
cording to (his view of) what the contract says. A rule that pros-
cribes the admission of "evidence that will vary the text then
becomes an exhortation to interpret correctly instead of incorrectly
and, as such, has no methodological significance whatsoever.
17 8
Michaels's essay reveals fundamental insights for legal study:
Legal discourse has essential characteristics only when it is part of
an ordered system in which it receives and manifests meaning.
Contemporary hermeneutics suggests the need to shift away from
the traditional essentialistic explanation of the relationship be-
have been better decided under the doctrine of mutual mistake. Id. at 187 n.4. This conclu-
sion would have rescinded the contract and would have acknowledged the hopeless ambigu-
ity of the word "chicken."
172. Michaels, supra note 149, at 26.
173. Id. at 31.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 33.
177. See supra note 164.
178. Michaels, supra note 149, at 28.
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tween language and reality and towards an understanding of lan-
guage that is more relativistic and functional. In Wittgenstein's
terms, it requires a shift from a "picture theory" of language to a
"use theory" of language; this will involve an analytical shift of fo-
cus from essences towards relations among phenomena.
179
V. CONCLUSION
The aim of this discussion has been to identify the fundamen-
tal features of several contemporary movements in continental
thought and to indicate their relevance to legal study. These three
areas are independent schools of thought, yet they are related in
their rejection of idealism, positivism, and objectivism. They are
united by their attention to the underlying phenomena under ex-
amination, whether it be the phenomenon of consciousness, the
deep structure of observed phenomena, or the discursive text.
They differ in their approach to each respective concern. Phenom-
enology seeks to develop a complete descriptive account of the
phenomenon of consciousness; structuralism seeks to identify the
organizing elements of the human mind that give form and order
to experience; hermeneutics seeks to go beyond the apparent state-
ment of a text to an interpretation that reveals the possibilities of
meaning inherent in a text.
Each of these methodologies has great significance for legal
scholarship. Tentative efforts at applying these methodologies re-
veal their contributions towards clarification, explanation, and in-
creased understanding. A phenomenological analysis of negligence
reveals the nonexistence of a radical break between intentional ac-
tion and negligence. The assertion of this break has led to an erro-
neous criticism of the punishment of negligence. A structuralist
analysis of the development of legal doctrine reveals its underlying
order. The identified process of the rational unconsciousness ex-
plains logically the shifts in legal decisions and reveals that legal
thinking is not an autonomous matter of reasoning, but rather re-
flects the fundamental patterns of human thought. A hermeneuti-
cal analysis of legal texts suggests the error of advancing isolated,
objectively known meanings for words and terms; what is often
identified as ambiguous or vague is not an intrinsic quality of the
179. L. WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. Anscombe trans. 1953). His
proposition 43 reads in part: "For a large class of cases-though not for all-in which we
employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the
language." Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
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usage, but a result of its disputed context.
This discussion has had an unavoidably tentative and sugges-
tive quality. American scholars have only begun to give attention
to the philosophical and critical movements that have developed in
Europe over the last half-century. We can expect a new vitality in
American legal scholarship as it begins to draw on the thoughts of
continental theorists.
